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"INTENSIONAL CONTEXTS" AND THE RULE THAT 
STATUTES SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS 
CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAWt 
John M. Rogers* 
Striving for consistency-for consistency, that is, properly under-
stood-must characterize legal reasoning in order for the reasoning 
to deseIVe to be called "legal." It may conceivably be "good" or 
"moral" for identically situated persons to be treated differently by in-
stitutions with power, but doing so can hardly be called "legal." Very 
careful attention must be given, of course, to what is meant by "identi-
cally situated," as no two different persons can be 100% identically 
situated. Their names, for instance, are different. By identical, we 
must mean no relevant distinction, or no distinction that selVes a pur-
pose that we can articulate and defend. Of course, people may have 
very different concepts of what is a relevant distinction and what is 
not, based on different conceptions of what is good, or valuable, or 
desirable. Evaluation of what distinctions are relevant is integral to 
the legal enterprise. The better it is done, the better law will seIVe the 
purposes that law is intended to seIVe. 
It is impossible to evaluate distinctions if consistency is not de-
manded. An argument that is inconsistent (in the sense that there is 
no defensible distinction justifying different treatment to similar situa-
tions) is therefore legally indefensible. For this reason, logic is bound 
up in the law. Sound legal reasoning must be logical legal reasoning. 
Otherwise the enterprise is flawed, if not doomed. Illogic is accord-
ingly a bane of the law. It is thus with open arms that scholars should 
welcome Professors Rodes and Pospesel's insightful treatise on sym-
bolic logic for legal analysis. 1 Law cannot be "too" logical. 
t Copyright © 1998 by John M. Rogers. 
* Brown, Todd & Heyburn Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law. I 
am grateful for comments and suggestions by Howard Posposel and my colleague, 
Michael P. Healy, and for the excellent research assistance of Wesley B. Tailor. 
1 ROBERT E. RODES, JR. & HOWARD POSPESEL, PREMISES AND CONCLUSIONS: SYM. 
BOLIC LoGIC FOR LEGAL ANALYSIS (1997). 
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If seeming logic leads to intuitively unsatisfying results, a trouble-
some answer is to eschew logic. A preferable answer is to explain the 
flaw in the logic. In their chapter on "Intensional Contexts," Rodes 
and Pospesel alert us to a logical flaw that, once explained, may help 
us reject legal results that give logic a bad name in the law. They use 
symbolic logic to do this. 
However, some bad law that seems to result from logical flaws 
may be more accurately attributed to differing value judgments or a 
differing weighing of public interests. If a legal result is criticized 
purely on the grounds that the logic fails, when in fact the logic is 
defensible but the policy is not, then it is just as hard to evaluate the 
criticism as in the reverse situation where there is a hidden flaw of 
logic. I am led to this observation from the seeming applicability of 
Rodes and Pospesel's treatment of intensional contexts to a legal rule 
that I have recently been devoting some attention. That rule is the 
canon, or maxim, that statutes will be construed, if possible, to con-
form to the international law obligations of the United States. 
What follows is a description of the rule, along with examples of 
its application, and a traditional legal justification of the rule on pol-
icy grounds. This is followed by my criticism of application of the rule 
in a particular case, United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization,2 
where the identified policies do not warrant its application. Next, I 
examine whether that criticism itself is subject to the criticism that a 
logical argument, along the lines of Rodes and Pospesel's, would have 
done just as well. In the end I reject this. In doing so, I evaluate 
whether perhaps some of the challenging examples used by Rodes 
and Pospesel are more easily explained and resolved using traditional 
legal analysis than through symbolic propositional analysis. 
I. THE RULE OF INTERPRETATION THAT STATUTES COMPORT WITH 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
The doctrine that United States courts will strive to interpret 
United States law consistently with international law goes back at least 
to the time of Chief Justice Marshall.3 In The Schooner Exchange,4 he 
interpreted "general statutory provisions [describing] ordinary juris-
2 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
3 The very concept of canons, or maxims, of statutory construction has been 
subjected to extensive criticism, but the criticism has not detracted from the wide-
spread judicial use of such rules of interpretation. See ABNER]. MIKVA & ERIC l...ANE, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 23-27 
(1997). 
4 The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
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diction of judicial tribunals" not to extend to a private suit claiming 
title to a French naval vessel where immunity from such a claim was an 
international obligation of the United States to France.5 
The Supreme Court had applied the maxim of statutory construc-
tion even earlier, in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy.6 In that case, 
the Court interpreted a U.S. statute forbidding commercial dealings 
with France by any person under the "protection" of the United States 
as not applying to a U.S.-born person who had go'ne to Danish terri-
tory and taken on Danish citizenship there. According to Marshall, 
an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of 
·nations if any other possible construction remains, and, conse-
quently, can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect 
neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations 
as understood in this country.7 
Subsequent cases have repeatedly followed the ,rule that United 
States statutes will be interpreted, if possible, consistently with the in-
ternational obligations of the United States, whether those obligations 
arise from customary law, as in The Schooner Exchange and The Charming 
Betsy, or from treaty. 
In Chew Heong v. United States8 the Supreme Court considered 
whether Congress, by statute, had withdrawn the privilege of a Chi-
nese laborer to return to the United States, a privilege held to be pro-
tected by an 1880 treaty with China. The Supreme Court found the 
statute did not limit the entry of Chinese laborers who had been in 
the United States when the treaty went into effect but who had left 
prior to the legislation in question. The statute, passed in 1882 and 
amended in 1884, precluded the immigration of Chinese workers, 
with the exception of such workers who had been in the United States 
before November 17, 1880 (the date of the Treaty).9 The statute, 
however, required as the only evidence of the right of re-entry a certif-
icate issued by U.S. Customs upon departure.10 Chinese who left the 
U.S. before the statute was enacted of course had no such certificate. 
Chew Heong was one such worker. He was thus effectively excluded 
by the literal language of the statute. The Supreme Court interpreted 
the language requiring a certificate as applying only to Chinese labor-
5 [d. at 146. 
6 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
7 [d. at 118. 
8 112 U.S. 536 (1884). 
9 An act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese, ch. 126, 
§ § 2-3, 22 Stat. 58, 59 (1882) (amended 1884), reproduced in Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 
544. 
10 § 4, 22 Stat. at 59-60, reproduced in Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 544-45. 
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ers departing the United States after the 1882 statute was passed.!1 A 
stricter interpretation, the Court found, would put the United States 
in violation of its treaty obligation to China.12 
We can initially identify two distinct but related ideas that support 
the rule that statutes will be interpreted to comport with the interna-
tional obligations of the United States. The first we may call legisla-
tive. That is, when a court is faced with two possible constructions of 
the law, and the court is not entirely sure which is correct, it in effect 
has a legislative choice. Particularly in a common law jurisdiction, 13 it 
may be argued that the court should make the choice that better fur-
thers public policy from its own perspective. In this way, the court acts 
as a sort of interim iegislature, deciding which way the statute should 
operate until the legislature says otherwise. Knowing that the interests 
of the United States are generally furthered by the nation's compli-
ance with its international obligations, the court chooses the option 
which it sees as better supported by public policy. That better choice 
is the interpretation that better enables the nation to benefit from the 
international legal system. 
Some lawyers, judges, and scholars will reject the idea that the 
courts in our constitutional system should legislate in this way, or 
would confine such legislation to the most limited of circumstances.14 
For them, the second justification of the interpretive rule is more per-
suasive-the court's role is to ascertain the intent of the legislature. 
That is, the court is not to determine what is good public policy when 
interpreting ambiguous statutes, but may look at public policy to de-
termine what the legislature intended. Since legislatures presumably 
want what better serves the public interest, the interpretation that bet-
ter serves the public interest is more likely what the legislature wanted. 
Where international law is involved, a court can reasonably conclude 
that the legislature would prefer the choice that keeps the nation in 
compliance with its international obligations. This argument may 
have more of a fictional air to it, but it fits more comfortably with 
traditional notions of the respective roles of the legislative and judicial 
branches. 
In his m~ority opinion in Chew Heong,Justice Harlan appeared to 
rely upon both ideas. He stressed the importance to the United States 
11 Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 548,554-55. 
12 !d. at 549-50. 
13 CfJOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw TRADmON 51-52 (2d ed. 1985). 
14 Textualists, for instance, don't like this idea because it requires an ambiguity 
and they like to think that in almost all cases texts have a determinate meaning. 
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to remain in compliance with its obligations, but he always tied this to 
the inferred intent of Congress: 
If, as claimed by [Chew], the Treaty of 1880, fairly interpreted, se-
cured to him, at the time of his departure for Honolulu, the right to 
go from and return to the United States at pleasure, without being 
subjected to regulations or conditions affecting the substance of 
that right, the court should be slow to assume that Congress in-
tended to violate the stipulations of a treaty, so recently made with 
the government of another country. "There would no longer be 
any security," says Vattel, "no longer any commerce between man-
kind, if they did not think themselves obliged to keep faith with 
each other, and to perform their promises." ... Aside from the duty 
imposed by the Constitution to respect treaty stipulations when they 
become the subject of judicial proceedings, the court cannot be un-
mindful of the fact, that the honor of the government and people 
of the United States is involved in every inquiry whether rights se-
cured by such stipulations shall be recognized and protected. And 
it would be wanting in proper respect for the intelligence and patri-
otism of a co-ordinate department of the government were it to 
doubt, for a moment, that these considerations were present in the 
minds of its members when the legislation in question was 
enacted.I5 
The interpretive rule was promoted to a "clear statement rule" in 
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo I6 and McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional 
de Marineros de Honduras.17 In these cases the Supreme Court inter-
preted the statutory jurisdiction of the U.S. National Labor Relations 
Board not to extend to operations of foreign-flag ships employing 
alien seamen, even though the broadly-worded jurisdictional provi-
sions literally encompassed such vessels when there was "a question of 
representation affecting . . . transportation . . . betw"een any foreign 
country and any State [of the United States.]"18 The statute was held 
15 Chew Hetmg, 112 U.S. at 539-40 (citations omitted). 
16 353 U.S. 138 (1957). 
17 372 U.S. 10 (1963). 
18 See 29 U.S.C. § 159{c)(l) (1994), quoted in McCuUoch, 372 U.S. at 15 n.5 
("Whenever a petition shall have been filed ... the Board shall investigate such peti-
tion and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a questitm of representatitm affecting 
commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing .... "); Id. § 152(6) (1994), 
quoted in McCuUoch, 372 U.S. at 15 n.3 ("The term 'commerce' means trade, traffic, 
commerce, transptntation, or communication among the several States, or between the 
District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other 
Territory, or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Co-
lumbia, or within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or betw"een points in the 
same State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or 
any foreign country.") (emphasis added). 
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not to warrant an exercise of jurisdiction by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board that would violate U.S. obligations to Honduras, absent a 
clearer expression by Congress: 
[I]f the sponsors of the original Act or of its amendments conceived 
of the application now sought by the Board they failed to translate 
such thoughts into describing the boundaries of the Act as includ-
ing foreign-flag vessels manned by alien crews. Therefore, we find 
no basis for a construction which would exert United States jurisdic-
tion over and apply its laws to the internal management and affairs 
of the vessels here flying the Honduran flag, contrary to the recog-
nition long afforded them not only by our State Department, but 
also by the Congress. In addition, our attention is called to the well-
established rule of international law that the law of the flag state 
ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship .... 
. . . We therefore conclude ... that for us to sanction the exercise of 
local sovereignty under such conditions in this "delicate field of in-
ternational relations there must be present the affirmative intention 
of the Congress clearly expressed." Since neither we nor the parties 
are able to find any such clear expression, we hold that the Board 
was without jurisdiction to order the election.19 
Although the McCulloch case is more often cited, the theory for 
requiring Congress to express clearly its intent to violate international 
obligations is more clearly laid out in Benz. 
The theory, analytically distinct from those of interstitial poli-
cymaking and accurately determining intent, may be called func-
tionaL That is, under our Constitutional system, any action that is 
likely to elicit foreign protest ought to be clearly attributable to one of 
the political branches-the President or Congress-since those arms 
of the government are better suited to deal with or respond to such 
protests. In Benz, Justice Clark (a former U.S. Attorney General) re-
lied direcdy upon the following historical sequence: The Supreme 
Court in a 1928 case, Jackson v. S.S. ''Archimedes,''20 had interpreted 
narrowly a federal statute prohibiting advance wage payments to 
merchant seamen. The statute was held not to extend to advance pay-
ments made by foreign vessels while in foreign ports, even where the 
recipient was an American and the ship was sailing for the United 
States, because Congress had not "specifically made" such a "sweep-
ing" provision.21 When proposals were subsequendy made in Con-
19 McCulloch, 372 u.s. at 20-22 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
20 275 u.s. 463 (1928). 
21 /d. at 470. The words extending the statute to "foreign vessels while in waters 
of the United States" were limited to payments in the United States, id. at 466-68, and 
the words of an amendment voiding wage advances "whether made within or without 
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gress to extend the Seamen's Act to just such situations, a "storm of 
diplomatic protest resulted," including vigorous denunciations from 
eight major maritime nations.22 "In each instance the bills died in 
Congress."23 The point drawn by Justice Clark from this historical ex-
ample was that the political branches bear the responsibility for 
United States infringements of international obligations. Under our 
system the political branches are more able to deal with, and perhaps 
avoid, the consequences of such infringements. 
For us to run interference in such a delicate field of international 
relations there must be present the affirmative intention of the' Con-
gress clearly expressed. It alone has the facilities necessary to make 
fairly such an important policy decision where the possibilities of 
international discord are so evident and retaliative action so certain. 
We, therefore, conclude that any such appeal should be directed to 
the Congress rather than the courts.24 
A necessary corollary is that the political branches must be seen by 
foreign states as responsible for the actions that they perceive to in-
fringe upon their rights. Only if the Congress (or the President) acts 
clearly to affect those rights is the protest likely to be directed where 
and when it belongs-at the political branches when they act.' If the 
political branches act ambiguously-thereby avoiding or postponing 
protest-and the Court interprets the action in a way that Violates in-
ternational obligations, the diplomatic heat may be directed at the 
Court, a body with little functional capability for dealing with it.25 
There are thus three mutually reinforcing, but analytically dis-
tinct, theories for courts to prefer statutory interpretations that keep 
the United States in conformity with its international obligations. 
First, it is good policy when competing interpretations are not disposi-
tive. Second, it is a good way to ascertain what the legislature actually 
meant. And third, infringements of foreign state rights should be 
the United States or territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof" were held not to 
apply to foreign vessels, id. at 469-70. 
22 Benz v. Campania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 146 (1957). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 146-47. 
25 My colleague, Michael Healy, suggests that this theory is not based on ambigu-
ity, since the "ambiguity" arguably arises because the clear statement rule is applied. 
He notes that it would be more accurate to say that Congress is acting without either 
debating or legislating as to the particular application of the act to foreign states. The 
result is perhaps more legitimate if framed as a "background rule" rather than as a 
"clear statement rule," since the Court can then simply say that Congress acts aware of 
the background rules. Either way, the result is that foreign states do not need to be as 
concerned about the effect of broadly worded statutes. 
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clearly stated so as to direct protest or retaliation where it belongs-
toward the political branches. 
All three theories contemplate that when Congress does act 
clearly, the courts of the United States must follow that clear action, 
rather than any "higher" international law. All of the cases cited as-
sume this, most of them explicitly. But just how clear does the Con-
gress have to be? In some cases the required level of clarity has been 
reached. 
In the Head Money Cases,26 decided the same day as Chew Heong, 
the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute levying "a duty of fifty 
cents for each and every passenger, not a citizen of the United States, 
who shall come by steam or sail vessel from a foreign port to any port 
within the United States."27 The taxpayer argued that implementa-
tion of this statute violated treaty obligations to foreign powers.28 
Although the Court doubted whether treaty provisions were violated, 
it chose to reject the argument instead on the ground that Congress 
in any event has the power to pass laws for the "enforcement, modifi-
cation, or repeal" of treaty obligations, insofar as such obligations are 
"the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country."29 
There appeared to be no question as to how the statute should be 
interpreted. The words "each and every passenger, not a citizen of 
the United States" apparently were clear enough. 
Also clear enough was Congress' response to Chew Heong. The 
U.S.-China treaty of November 17, 1880, permitted the United States 
to limit the entry of Chinese workers, but permitted Chinese workers 
who had entered before that date and gone back home, to return to 
the United States30 A federal statute required such workers upon 
their return to present a certificate obtained from U.S. Customs when 
they had departed the United States31 That statute was interpreted in 
Chew Heongnot to apply to returning laborers who had left the United 
States before the certificate requirement was enacted in 1882.32 Con-
gress subsequently perceived fraud on the part of new workers who 
claimed to have been in the United States before 1880, and in 1888 
enacted a new statute simply making it 
26 112 u.s. 580 (1884). 
27 An act to regulate Immigration, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (1882), reprinted in Head 
Money Cases, 112 u.s. at 589-90. 
28 See Money Head Cases, 112 u.s. at 585. 
29 Id. at 599. 
30 See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text. 
31 See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text. 
32 See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text. 
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unlawful for any [C] hinese laborer who shall at any time heretofore 
have been, or who may now or hereafter be, a resident within the 
United States, and who shall have departed, or shall depart, there-
from, and shall not have returned before the passage of this act, to 
return to, or remain in, the United States.33 
The 1888 Act also voided departure certificates issued under the 
previous act. In Chae Chan Ping v. United States,34 the Supreme Court 
upheld the exclusion of a Chinese laborer who had lived in California 
from 1875 until 1887, and who had a departure certificate entitling 
him to return. As in the Head Money Cases, the Court rejected the 
argument that Congress had no power to determine how or whether 
the United States would comply with its treaty obligations. There was 
no question as to the interpretation of the statute; it was assumed to 
conflict with the treaty obligation.35 
These cases are all consistent with each of the theories for the 
interpretive rule that statutes are to be construed where possible as 
consistent with international law obligations.36 First, if no ambiguity 
exists, there is no room for interstitial policy-making. Second, there is 
no need to figure out by looking at international law what Congress 
meant if Congress by the statute in the Head Money Cases cannot have 
meant the head tax not to have been paid, or if Congress by the stat-
ute in Chae Chan Ping cannot have meant that Chinese laborers be 
readmitted. Finally, if the legislation is clear enough to put a poten-
tially offended foreign state on notice, then the functional purpose of 
the clear statement rule is met. In these cases Congress appeared to 
know exactly what it was requiring, and foreign ministries of foreign 
states could likewise figure it out. 
We can make the following conclusions about the rule of 
interpretation: 
1. It helps the United States remain in compliance with its inter-
national obligations, thereby furthering the national interest 
by increasing the ability of the nation to get the benefit of the 
international legal system. 
2. It applies regardless of whether the international legal obliga-
tion is one of treaty law or customary law. 
33 An act to supplement an act entitled "An act to execute certain treaty stipula-
tions relating to Chinese," ch. 1064,25 Stat. 504, 504 (1888). 
34 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
35 Id. at 600-10. 
36 The only issue we are treating here is the interpretation of the statute, in light of 
the alleged violation of international law. An argument that a treaty of the United 
States is constitutionally supenorto a later-enacted statute (explicitly rejected in Chae 
Chan Ping and the Head Money Cases) is a very different one and not dealt with here. 
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3. At the same time, it preserves the ability of the elected political 
branches (Congress and President) to have the final say with 
respect to issues other than the interpretation of the U.S. Con-
stitution. Final say regarding constitutional interpretation is a 
special prerogative of the unelected, independent courts in 
our system, best preserved by not expanding such final author-
ity to other areas. 
Moreover, the fact that the decisions of the political branches are 
ultimately determinative of how our nation acts in the international 
legal system does not in the least undermine the effectiveness of the 
international system of binding obligations. Each nation determines 
for itself which arm of its government will make such decisions. 
More recent cases reflect the same consistent understanding. In 
Weinberger v. Rossi,37 the Supreme Court interpreted a statute that pro-
tected American dependents on foreign military bases from employ-
ment discrimination "unless prohibited by treaty."38 An executive 
agreement between the United States and the Philippines, binding in 
international law, gave preference to Filipino employees at military 
bases in the Philippines.39 Some American employees of a U.S. naval 
base challenged the preference.4o The American employees relied 
upon the statute, while the U.S. Government relied upon the treaty 
exception. The Supreme Court was required to interpret Congress' 
use of the word "treaty" in the statute. The word could have the inter-
national connotation of a written, binding international agreement, 
or it could have the more limited meaning of a "Treaty" under the 
United States Constitution, that is, an instrument that under Article II 
requires consent by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate.41 The executive 
agreement involved in Weinbargerwas an international "treaty" but not 
an Article II "Treaty."42 The Court interpreted the word "treaty" in 
the statute in the broader sense, to include internationally binding ex-
ecutive agreements, so as to avoid an interpretation that would result 
in an international law violation on the part of the United States to 
the Philippines.43 
37 456 U.S. 25 (1982). 
38 5 U.S.C. § 7201 (1976) (amended 1978). 
39 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Relating to the Employment of Phil-
lipine Nationals in the United States Military Bases in the Phillipines, May 27, 1968, 
U.S.-Phil., art I, 19 U.S.T. 5892, 5892-93. 
40 See Weinbarger, 456 U.S. at 28. 
41 Id. at 29-30. 
42 Id. at 30-3l. 
43 Id. at 36. 
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The Court's reasoning fit perfectly with the first and second theo-
ries for the rule of interpretation: 
[1]f Congress intended to limit the "treaty exception" in § 106 to 
Art. II treaties, it must have intended to repudiate these executive 
agreements that affect the hiring practices of the United States only 
at its military bases overseas. One would expect that Congress 
would be aware that executive agreements may represent a quid pro 
quo: the host country grants the United States base rights in ex-
change, inter alia, for preferential hiring of local nationals.44 
This is a pointed expression of the national interest supporting 
compliance with international law obligations, combined with attribu-
tion to Congress of a recognition of that interest.45 
The rule of interpretation also continues to thrive with respect to 
customary law. The rule is so deeply embedded in our law that it is 
sometimes hardly mentioned. For instance, in United States v. Columba-
Colella,46 the Fifth Circuit reversed a federal criminal conviction of a 
British national accused of receiving in Mexico an automobile previ-
ously stolen in the United States. The criminal statute on which he 
was convicted provides: ''Whoever receives . . . any motor vehicle or 
aircraft, which has crossed a State or United States boundary after be-
ing stolen, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both."47 
Under customary international law, one state may not criminally 
prosecute the national of another state for an action (1) outside the 
territory of the prosecuting state, (2) not directed at the governmen-
tal functions or national security of the prosecuting state, (3) with no 
intended or actual effect in the prosecuting state, (4) except for cer-
tain crimes against the international system, such as piracy.48 In a 
44 Id. at 31-32. 
45 In Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984), the Supreme 
Court applied the rule of interpretation to uphold a treaty limit on airline baggage 
loss liability, where the treaty tied the amount of the limit to the gold standard, but a 
later U.S. statute had taken the United States off the gold standard. 
46 604 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1979). 
47 18 U.S.C. § 2313(a) (1994). 
48 See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 300-05 (4th 
ed. 1990); S.Z. Feller,jurisdiction over Offenses with a Foreign Element, in 2 A TREATISE ON 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 5, 17-34 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds. 
1973); Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime: Intro-
ductory Comment, 29 AM.]. INT'L L. 443, 445 (Supp. 1935);]ohn M. Rogers, Prosecuting 
Terrorists: When Does Apprehension in Violation of International Law Preclude Trial?, 42 U. 
MIAMI L. REv. 447, 448 n.5 (1987); Lotika Sarkar, The Proper Law of Crime in Interna-
tional Law, in lNTERNA:nONAL CRIMINAL LAw 50 (Gerhard O.W. Mueller & Edward M. 
WISe eds., 1965). 
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careful opinion, the Fifth Circuit came to the conclusion that under 
these principles of customary international law the British national 
could not be tried by the United States, and reversed his conviction.49 
Although almost all of the opinion examines the relevant interna-
tionallaw,50 one sentence links the international law to the law of the 
United States, that is, to the law that Fifth Circuit judges are sworn to 
uphold: "We find that because the defendant's act in this case is be-
yond its competence to proscribe, Congress did not intend to assert 
jurisdiction here under 18 U.S.C. § 2313."51 
The situation in Columba-Colella is precisely the type of situation 
where the rule of interpretation is most properly applied. The statu-
tory language is very general. It does not reflect specific congressional 
intent to cover a situation involving a foreigner acting abroad, but 
does apply to a large number of situations in which there would be no 
international violation, such as where the automobile is received by an 
American, or received by a foreigner in the United States. Thus, Ca-
lumba-Colella is very different from the Head Money and Chae Chan Ping 
cases, where interpreting the general language not to violate the 
treaty obligation would have made the statutory language virtually 
inoperative. 
The "boundary-crossing" jurisdictional requirement on the re-
ceipt of stolen automobiles in the federal criminal statute in Columba-
Colella was presumably included by Congress to eliminate any argu-
ment that the statute exceeded federal power under Article I of the 
United States Constitution. 52 If the "boundary-crossing" provision of 
the statute was intended to preserve state as opposed to federal juris-
diction, there is no reason to attribute to the words the unrelated ef-
fect of infringing on international obligations. By not interpreting 
the statute to go so far, the court furthered the public policy of keep-
ing the United States in compliance with its international obligations, 
and comported with what presumably would be the intent of Congress 
if Congress had thought about the subject, taking international law 
49 See Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d at 359. 
50 Id. at 358-60. 
51 Id. at 360. 
52 As explained in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995): 
Congress is empowered to regulate ... persons or things in interstate com-
merce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities. See, 
e.g., Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (upholding 
amendments to Safety Appliance Act as applied to vehicles used in intrastate 
commerce); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (["F]or example, the 
destruction of an aircraft (18 U.S.C. § 32), or ... thefts from interstate ship-
ments (18 U.S.C. § 659)"). 
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into account. The interpretation also served the functional purpose 
of requiring Congress explicitly to extend the statute to activities by 
foreign nationals abroad, if that was the desire of Congress. Govern-
ments of foreign nationals could then properly direct their protests 
toward the political branches of the government. 
II. THE PLO CAsE 
The rule of interpretation was applied with extraordinary, proba-
bly excessive, force in a 1988 case involving the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO).53 Prior to the PLO-Israeli peace process, the 
PLO was treated by the United States as an illegitimate terrorist organ-
ization. The PLO had, however, obtained a measure of respectability 
in other quarters, including the United Nations, which invited it to 
become an "observer" in 1974.54 The United States, as host country to 
UN Headquarters, had entered into a treaty with the United Nations 
in 1947, known as the Headquarters Agreement, that provided: 
The federal, state or local authorities of the United States shall not 
impose any impediments to transit to or from the headquarters dis-
trict of (1) representatives of Members ... , (5) other persons in-
vited to the headquarters district by the United Nations . . . on 
official business.55 
The United States accordingly permitted the PLO observer mis-
sion to set up an office in New York. In 1987 the U.S. Congress passed 
a statute (the Anti-terrorism Act of 1987 or "ATA") explicitly finding 
the PLO to be "a terrorist organization and a threat to the interests of 
the United States, its allies, and to international law."56 The statute 
made it unlavvful for the PLO, 
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, to establish or 
maintain an office, headquarters, premises or other facilities or es-
tablishments within the jurisdiction of the United States at the be-
hest or direction of [the PLO].57 
How clear can you get? Not clear enough, according to the U.S. 
District Court in New York where the U.S. Attorney General sought an 
53 See United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F. Supp. 1456 
(S.D.N.Y.1988) [hereinafter PLO]. 
54 See id. at 1459. 
55 Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States of America Re-
garding the Headquarters of the United Nations, June 26, 1947, U.S.-U.N. art. IV, 
§ 11, 61 Stat. 756, 76l. 
56 22 U.S.C. § 5201 (b) (1994). 
57 22 U.S.C. § 5202(3) (1994). 
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injunction to close the office of the PLO observer mission to the 
UN. 58 
The court first determined that the United States was under an 
international obligation to permit the PLO mission to remain in New 
York. This conclusion was based on the language of the Headquarters 
Agreement, United States practice under that treaty, the position of 
the U.S. Executive Branch as expressed by the Department of State, as 
well as the repeatedly stated position of the UN General Assembly.59 
Applying the rule of interpretation, the court found that the ATA did 
not clearly enough require violation of the international obligation. 
First, the court reasoned that the ATA did not mention the ob-
server mission or the Headquarters Agreement.60 Second, the words 
"notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary" did not say 
"notwithstanding any treaty to the contrary."61 Third, no "member of 
Congress, at any point, explicitly stated that the ATA was intended to 
override any international obligation of the United States."62 
While the court's reasoning may have a superficial plausibility 
about it, it is not supported by any of the theories that underpin the 
rule of interpretation. First, it is a stretch to say that there is any inter-
pretative gap for the court to fill here. There is only in the most fic-
tional sense an ambiguity as to whether the language covered the 
mission in New York. It is true that the language is general, but the 
mere fact of generality does not raise the possibility of implied 
exceptions. 
An exception that eliminates all or a large portion of the effect of 
general statutory language is much harder to infer than an exception 
that leaves most of the effect of the general statutory language intact. 
Thus the general language in The Schooner Exchange (general jurisdic-
tion over property disputes), in McCulloch (transportation involving 
foreign commerce), and in Columba-Colella (receiving stolen 
automobiles that had been transported across an international bor-
der) all retained the bulk of their effect after being interpreted not to 
extend so as to violate international obligations. In contrast, the gen-
eral language in the Head Money cases (each and every passenger), 
would have applied only rarely if an exception had been inferred for 
nationals of states with whom the United States had friendship trea-
ties, because of the large number of such states. And the statutory 
58 See PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1460. 
59 Id. at 1465-68. 
60 /d. at 1468. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1470. 
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language in Chae Chan Ping (any Chinese laborer), at least in the view 
of the Court, would have been engulfed by an exception for Chinese 
alleging they had been in the United States before 1880. There were 
only two PLO offices in the United States at the time of the ATA, one 
in Washington, D.C. and the observer mission in New York. 63 To say 
that general language applying to "offices, premises, or other facili-
ties" might apply to only one of them is to read away fully half of the 
general applicability of the words. 
It is especially hard to reconcile the second theory of the rule of 
interpretation with the holding in the PLO case. Did Congress actu-
ally intend to close the PLO observer mission in New York? It is hard 
to deny that it did, in light of the legislative history that the court itself 
relied upon. As the court said, ["t]he proponents of the ATA were, at 
an early stage and throughout its consideration, forewarned that the 
ATA would present a potential conflict with the Headquarters Agree-
ment."64 The Secretary of State and the Legal Adviser of the State 
Department had written letters to that effect.65 The court's conclu-
sion was not that Congress did not mean to close the mission, but 
rather that Congress did not necessarily intend to violate the Head-
quarters Agreement: 
The only debate on this issue focused not on whether the ATA 
would [override any international obligation], but on whether the 
United States in fact had an obligation to provide access to the PLO. 
Indeed, every proponent of the ATA who spoke to the matter ar-
gued that the United States did not have such an obligation.66 
The court concluded that the ATA and its legislative history therefore 
did not "manifest Congress' intent to abrogate" the obligation to com-
ply with the Headquarters Agreement.67 
The court's argument thus boils down to this: Congress did not 
understand the international legal implications of closing the mission. 
The court did not decide whether Congress meant to close the mis-
sion. Such analysis turns the second theory of the rule of interpreta-
tion completely on its head. That theory is that Congress' words 
should be interpreted to comport with international law because we 
assume that Congress legislates in conformity with the international 
obligations of the United States. Ifwe assume that Congress misunder-
63 The Washington office was closed in December, 1987 under the provisions of 
the Foreign Missions Act. See Palestine Info. Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 935 (D.C. 
Cir.1988). 
64 PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1469. 
65 fd. at 1470 & nn. 35-36. 
66 fd. at 1470. 
67 fd. at 1471. 
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stands those obligations, then by that very assumption, the content of 
the obligations no longer serves as a guide to actual Congressional 
intent. 
The third theory also does not support the court's conclusion. 
The international implications of the legislation were from the start 
very clear to the members of the international organization to whom 
the United States owed the obligation. The UN General Assembly re-
sponded to passage of the ATA well before the action was brought to 
enforce it in court.68 Indeed, before the ATA's prohibition on PLO 
offices went into effect, the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
had obtained an advisory opinion from the International Court of Jus-
tice to the effect that the United States was bound to arbitrate the 
dispute precipitated by passage of the ATA. 69 There was thus no ques-
tion that the ATA was specific enough to bring the international issue 
to the attention of the foreign obligees of the United States, and that 
protest would be accordingly directed to the appropriate political 
branches. The structural purposes of the clear statement rule would 
thus have been amply met by an order enforcing the plain meaning of 
the ATA. 
The structural theory of Benz and McCulloch was based on the pri-
mary assignment of operating in the international legal system to the 
political branches of the government. The district court in U.S. v. 
PLO turned this theory on its head and instead effectively applied a 
different kind of structural theory. That is, the courts will not enforce 
directions from Congress based on erroneous interpretations of inter-
national law until Congress has considered and explicitly rejected the 
court's interpretation of that international law. This type of structural 
argument assumes the superiority of courts in determining and apply-
ing international legal obligations. In that sense the opinion is wholly 
unprecedented.70 
68 [d. at 1467 n.27 (citing G.A. Res. 42/229A, Agenda item 136 (March 2, 1988». 
69 [d. at 1461 (citing Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 
of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, 1988 LCJ. 12 (April 
26, 1988». 
70 The decision is also troublesome because it was used by the Executive Branch 
to circumvent the clear intent of Congress. Although the President had signed the 
ATA, the Executive Branch had consistently opposed the requirement that the ob-
server mission be closed. See id. at 1466-67. The ATA contained a provision requiring 
the Attorney General to institute legal action to close the mission, 22 U.S.C. 
§ 5203(a), and the U.S. Justice Department complied by bringing the suit. Certainly 
it would have been irresponsible within the U.S. legal system for the Attorney Gen-
eral, in the face of such a clear directive, simply not to have sought enforcement of 
the statute. It was perhaps equally irresponsible not to appeal the decision of the 
district court in this case, yet that is what the Department of Justice decided. 
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III. AN EAsIER ANSWER? 
Rodes and Pospesel's treatment of "intensional contexts" suggests 
that there was an easier way to criticize the result in the PLO case. 
That is, that the reasoning was illogical and the conclusion therefore 
invalid. Rodes and Pospesel, for instance, posit an argument they call 
"Smith's Beliefs": 
Smith believes that all Lutherans are Protestants. 
Jones is a Lutheran. 
So, Smith believes that Jones is a Protestant. 71 
Rodes and Pospesel explain that this is an invalid argument 
which, understood properly, has no valid expression in symbolic logic: 
"It is clearly possible for the premises of this argument to be true and 
the conclusion false (Smith may not know Jones or he may mistakenly 
think that Jones is Catholic)."72 Rodes and Pospesel then identify 
ways to recognize the types of troublesome expressions that seem to 
permit such invalid conclusions.73 
The argument suggests the following reproach for my criticism of 
the PLO case. Why did I not simply argue that the district court made 
the same logical error as in Smith's Beliefs, to wit: 
Congress intends that its statutes comport with international law. 
International law does not permit closure of the PLO mission to the 
UN. 
So, Congress intended its statute not to require closure of the PLO 
mission to the UN. 
Assuming that this is a fair restatement of the reasoning of the 
court in the PLO case, why is this not just as illogical as Smith's Beliefs? 
It is a formulation that appears to parallel all of the examples of syllo-
gisms that Rodes and Pospesel term defective. Other examples are: 
The decision not to appeal can be praised as keeping the United States in con-
formity with its international obligations, but it subverted the constitutional allocation 
of authority among the three branches. The President could have vetoed the legisla-
tion as a whole, but having signed it he should be required to comply with it. The 
only exception should be if the statute is unconstitutional. Even in cases of asserted 
unconstitutionality, the Department of Justice generally appeals such determinations 
by lower courts to the U.S. Supreme Court. A lower court holding that a statute does 
not mean what it says, combined with an executive determination not to appeal, 
amounts to tlvo branches acting in cahoots to deprive the third branch of its legiti-
mate power. Such a distortion of our domestic system of separation of powers is not 
required by the international legal system, which operates generally without regard to 
which domestic arm carries out the state's international obligations. 
71 RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 1, at 298. 
72 [d. 
73 [d. at 302. 
and 
and 
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You can learn from the dictionary that a person who collects butter-
flies is a lepidopterist. 
George collects butterflies. 
So, you can learn from the dictionary that George is a lepidopterist. 
Pat hates Communists. 
Natasha is a Communist. 
So, Pat hates Natasha. 
O'Brien believes that all Irish children should learn Gaelic. 
Maureen is an Irish child. 
So, O'Brien believes that Maureen should learn Gaelic.74 
In each case the reasoning appears defective according to Rodes 
and Pospesel. 75 That is, in each case the first two premises may be 
true while the last not. The dictionary may say nothing about George. 
Pat may like Natasha (not knowing, for instance, her political prefer-
ences). O'Brien may not even know of Maureen's existence. 
The fallacies are likely to occur, according to Rodes and Pospesel, 
when the first premise is de dicto (about a statement) and not de re 
(about a thing).76 A de dicto statement ascribes a property to a state-
ment or proposition, while a de re statement assigns a property to an 
individual or thing rather than to another statement.77 Thus in the 
first example, the first sentence tells the reader something about the 
statement "a person who collects butterflies is a lepidopterist," and, in 
the third example, the first sentence tells the reader something about 
the statement "all Irish children should learn Gaelic." The premise of 
the second example is also de dicto, presumably because it is the logical 
equivalent of "Pat thinks that Communists are evil," and thus tells the 
reader something about the statement "Communists are evil." 
Rodes and Pospesel point out that it is not always easy to deter-
mine whether a premise is de dicto or de re,78 and that some interpre-
tive effort is often needed to apply the distinction.79 Once a premise 
is identified as de dicto, however, it risks being the basis of a logically 
defective syllogism.8o 
74 Id. at 310. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 302-08. 
77 Id. at 306. 
78 Id. at 305-06. 
79 !d. at 308-09. 
80 Id. at 302-03, 308. 
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The examples I have quoted from Rodes and Pospesel involve 
statements where, as a matter of propositional logic, the relevant crite-
rion is truth. Rodes and Pospesel suggest that the analysis can be 
used, however, to criticize a legal conclusion.81 Rodes and Pospesel 
examine the holding of Commonwealth v. Duchnicz, 82 in which a man 
was held not guilty of rape because the victim consented, where at the 
time of intercourse the victim had mistaken the defendant intruder to 
be her husband.83 Rodes and Pospesel identify the following reason-
ing as defective: 
Defendant Duchnicz rapes victim Jane only if she does not consent 
(to make true the proposition)84 that Jane Doe has intercourse with 
Duchnicz. Jane Doe's consent is demonstrated by the following 
subproof: 
A Jane Doe consented (to make true the proposition) that Jane 
Doe has intercourse with the man in her bed. 
81 As I have argued elsewhere, a meaningful analogue to truth in . legal logic is 
"lawness." John M. Rogers and Robert E. MoIzon, Some Lessrms About the Law from Self-
Referential Problems in Mathematics, 90 MICH. L. REv. 992, 998-99 (1992). In other 
words, talking logically about the law requires treating "what the law requires (pro-
vides)" as the criterion for validity, rather than "what is true." A scientist may say: 
Humans over 18 years of age have forgotten their baby experiences. 
John is a human over 18 years of age. 
So, John has forgotten his baby experiences. 
If the first two statements are true, then the third statement is also true. In contrast, a 
lawyer may say: 
Citizens over 18 have the right to vote. 
John is a citizen over 18 years of age. 
So, John has the right to vote. 
If the first statement is the law, and the second statement is true (as a matter of fact or 
law, or both), then the third statement is the law. 
Of course, if the logician is wedded to the idea that the relevant criterion must be 
truth, another way to express the legal syllogism is as follows: 
It is the law that citizens over 18 years of age have the right to vote. 
It is the law that (or Under the law) John is a citizen over 18 years of age. 
So, it is the law that John has the right to vote. 
Note that this appears to put every statement about the law in the de dicto category. 
82 42 Pa. C. 651 (1914). 
83 RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 1, at 297. Rodes and Pospesel suggest that the 
court "could not find a way around" the woman's consent. Id. 
84 Rodes and Pospesel insert the "make true the proposition" language (set off 
here with parentheses inserted by me) to emphasize the de dicto nature of the prem-
ise. Consent makes sense as a legal matter, only if it relates to an action of another. It 
can of course refer to a proposition if the proposition describes an action, and that is 
what is the case here. But if consent is, in contrast, being used to mean assent to the 
truth of a statement (whether a statement about an action or some other statement), 
then its meaning is taken altogether too far from the law. 
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B. The man in Jane Doe's bed was Duchnicz. 
C. Therefore, Jane Doe consented (to make true the proposition) 
that Jane Doe has intercourse with Duchnicz.85 
This reasoning is said to be defective,86 but is it? 
The answer appears to depend on the meaning of "consent." 
Consent can have a number of meanings. Three possibilities are; 
Victim consentsl by acting outwardly so as to give a reasonable actor 
the belief that victim does not object to the action. 
Victim consents2 by not objecting inwardly to the action of a defend-
ant at the time of the action. 
Victim consentss if and only if she would not object inwardly to the 
action of the defendant if she knew certain facts (such as the 
identity of the actor).87 
These and other definitions of consent often do not need to be 
distinguished. In a typical case, for instance, a victim's outward action 
reflects the victim's inward thoughts, and the victim either knows the 
identity of the defendant, or it doesn't matter. In such cases it is not 
necessary to be as precise about the definition of consent. In a case 
like Duchnicz, it becomes important. 
"Where consent is a defense in intentional crimes and in inten-
tional torts, the law must balance the interests of persons acting in the 
reasonable belief that there has been consent to contact (and the in-
85 RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 1, at 309-10. 
86 More precisely, Rodes and Pospesel reason: 
The argument appears to have a valid symbolization only by employing the 
predicate 'Jane Doe consents to make true the proposition that Jane Doe has 
intercourse with x.' The predicate is illicit because it attempts to express a 
proposition with an incomplete phrase ('the proposition that Jane Doe has 
intercourse with x'). 
/d. at 310. The idea here appears to be that the syllogism translates validly into sym-
bolic logic only if the phrase "the man in her bed" is a "variable" (the equivalent 
perhaps of "whatever man is in her bed" rather than of "the particular man who was 
actually in her bed at the time"), and "placing a variable in an intensional context" is 
not permitted by the logical system Rodes and Pospesel are using because it leads to 
the same kind of fallacy as presented by Smith's Beliefs. [d. at 302. 
87 To make the precise definitions correspond to the "make true the proposition" 
language of Rodes and Pospesel, the definitions would read: 
Victim consents l by acting outwardly so as to give a reasonable actor the 
belief that victim does not object to making true the proposition that the 
action occur. 
Victim consents2 by not objecting inwardly at the time of an action to mak-
ing true the proposition that the action of the defendant occurs. 
Victim consents3 if and only if upon later learning certain facts (such as the 
identity of the actor) she would not have objected inwardly to making true 
the proposition that the action of the defendant occurs. 
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terest of society in encouraging or permitting such contact) with the 
interest of potential victims in avoiding unwanted pain or contact. 
The balance may be different depending on the crime or tort in-
volved, since society may have more or less of an interest in encourag-
ing or permitting the contact, and society may have more or less of an 
interest in ensuring freedom from unwanted contact. The first defini-
tion of consent (consentl) places a high value on the interests of per-
sons acting in the face of outward manifestations of nonobjection.88 
Consent2 places a greater value on maintaining the mental peace of 
the victim, since it makes the actor affirmatively responsible for ascer-
taining the actual desires of the victim. Consent3 protects not just the 
mental peace of the victim at the time of the act, but also the mental 
peace of the victim at a later time. The third definition may be more 
warranted where the contact has a stigmatic or humiliating aspect, 
such as in the case of sexual intercourse. These definitions do not 
correspond to Rodes and Pospesel's distinction between de dicto and de 
re statements. Instead they incorporate different social policies about 
what activity society wants to protect or deter. 
If consent is defined precisely enough to take care of the factual 
situation to which it is being applied, then the syllogism that Rodes 
and Pospesel describe is perfectly valid. Consider the following: 
A Jane Doe consented1 that Jane Doe has intercourse with the man 
in her bed. 
B. The man in Jane Doe's bed was Duchnicz. 
C. Therefore, Jane Doe consented1 that Jane Doe has intercourse 
with Duchnicz. 
With consent precisely defined, this syllogism is perfectly accepta-
ble. If Duchnicz reasonably believes thatJane Doe agrees to have sex 
with him, then there is consentl. If Duchnicz deceived Jane Doe, or 
knew of her mistake and took advantage of it knowing it could make a 
difference to her decision, there would not be consentl.89 These con-
88 Thus in the famous case of O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891), 
a ship passenger sued a shipping company on the basis of a vaccination by the ship's 
surgeon that she claimed she did not agree to. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts rejected the claim since ["t]here was nothing in the conduct of the plaintiff 
to indicate to the surgeon that she [plaintiff] did not wish to [avoid] quarantine and 
to be vaccinated, if necessary, for that purpose." Id. at 266. 
89 Thus, even a hundred years ago, courts had no difficulty finding consent to be 
vitiated by deceit. In DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881), a woman undergoing 
childbirth had agreed to the presence of a person who was not a doctor. She was 
permitted to recover against that person "upon afterwards ascertaining his true char-
acter," where the court assumed that nondisclosure of the person's lay status 
amounted to deceit. Id. at 148. 
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clusions are consistent with the social policies that support the defini-
tion of consentl. 
Now consider the syllogism using consent2: 
A. Jane Doe consented2 that Jane Doe has intercourse with the man 
in her bed. 
B. The man in Jane Doe's bed was Duchnicz. 
C. Therefore, Jane Doe consented2 that Jane Doe has intercourse 
with Duchnicz. 
This syllogism also works fine. Recall that consent2 means not 
objecting inwardly to the action of a defendant at the time of the ac-
tion. If Jane Doe did not inwardly object to intercourse with Duchnicz 
because she thought he was her husband at the time, then she con-
sented2• This conclusion is consistent with the policy that supports the 
definition of consent2. That is, the harm of the contact that is primar-
ily abhorred by society is that suffered at the time of contact, and not 
later. Thus there are perfectly reasonable tort cases where a material 
mistake by plaintiff does not vitiate consent.90 In the context of a 
criminal proceeding for rape, it seems bad to define consent this way. 
It inadequately deters deception by aggressive men, and it places too 
little value on protecting victims from the shame and mental distress 
of having been deceived. The counter-argument, weak as it may be, is 
that the heavy criminal penalty for rape should not be imposed for 
what is essentially fraud.91 
Finally, consider the syllogism using consent3: 
A. Jane Doe consenteds that Jane Doe has intercourse with the man 
in her bed. 
B. The man in Jane Doe's bed was Duchnicz. 
C. Therefore, Jane Doe consenteds that Jane Doe has intercourse 
with Duchnicz. 
This syllogism also works fine. Recall that consent3 means not 
objecting inwardly to the action if she knew the identity of the actor. 
Jane Doe presumably did not consent3 that she have intercourse with 
the man in her bed, since she would object inwardly (not to mention 
outwardly) if she knew the identity of the actor. Therefore since A is 
90 In medical malpractice cases, for instance, the failure of a doctor to give infor-
mation about how risky a procedure is does not automatically invalidate a patient's 
consent to be operated upon, even if knowing would have caused the patient to refuse 
treatment. See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS 121 (5th 
ed. 1984) (showing that the plaintiff must also prove that the failure to inform was 
careless). 
91 By analogy in the tort context, a man who takes indecent liberties on the false 
pretext that he is a doctor is liable for battery, while a man who pays for sex with a 
counterfeit bill is not. See id. at 120. 
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not the case, C cannot be concluded. Jane Doe did not consent3 to 
intercourse with Duchnicz. 
All of this is not meant to demonstrate that one definition of con-
sent is preferable to others. Rather it shows ~at with precision of 
definition, the syllogism is perfectly acceptable for la'wyers and courts, 
even where the troublesome characteristics identified by Rodes and 
Pospesel are present. It really does little good to criticize the holding 
of Duchnicz for the invalidity of its logic; the logic is impeccable if the 
meanings are clear and consistent. 
Ifwe now look at the canon or maxim that statutes be interpreted 
consistently with international law, we can identify two perfectly rea-
sonable meanings of Congressional "intent" to comply with interna-
tionallaw: 
Congress intends1 to conform a statute to another law when it does 
not want to conflict with that other law even if Congress is mis-
taken as to the content of that other law. 
Congress intends2 to conform a statute to another law if and only if 
it does not want the statute to conflict with that other law as Con-
gress would interpret that other law. 
These definitions-like the various definitions of consent-often 
do not need to be distinguished. In a typical case, for instance, a 
court can attribute to Congress the same understanding of the other 
law at which the court arrives. In the classic cases applying the rule of 
interpretation regarding international law-from The Schooner Ex-
change, The Charming Betsy and Chae Chan' Ping to Rossi and Columba-
Colella-there is no indication that Congress understood the content 
of the international legal obligation of the United States any differ-
ently from the courts. In such cases it was not necessary to be very 
precise about the definition of intent. In a case like the PLO, it be-
came important. 
The canon that statutes be construed consistently with interna-
tionallaw balances the value to society of U.S. conformance with inter-
national obligations with the value to society of having the elected, 
politically-sensitive branches of government make foreign policy deci-
sions rather than independent and relatively isolated courts. The first 
definition of intent (intentl ) places a relatively higher value on the 
former consideration. Intent2 places a greater value on the latter. 
Only by weighing the values and interests involved can one interpreta-
tion be said to be better than the other. My analysis was an attempt to 
do this. Because of the nature of international law as a system of hori-
zontally-enforced binding obligations, and the need for courts to pre-
sexve their legitimacy by reversing Congress only for constitutional 
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violations, intent2 is the preferable interpretation. But these defini-
tions do not correspond to Rodes and Pospesel's distinction between 
de dicto and de re statements of law. Instead they incorporate different 
social policies about what courts should have the power to decide. 
If intent is defined precisely enough to resolve the PLO case, then 
the syllogism of the court in that case is perfectly valid: 
A. Congress intended! that its statute comport with international 
law. 
B. International law does not permit closure of the PLO mission to 
the UN. 
C. So, Congress intended! its statute not to require closure of the 
PLO mission to the UN. 
With intent precisely defined, this syllogism is perfectly accepta-
ble. Since intent1 is not dependent on a proper understanding of in-
ternationallaw in either the premise or the conclusion, Congress did 
not intend1 to close the PLO mission. 
Now consider the syllogism using intent2: 
A. Congress intends2 that its statutes comport with international 
law. 
B. International law [as interpreted by Congress] does not permit 
closure of the PLO mission to the UN. 
C. So, Congress intended2 its statute not to require closure of the 
PLO mission to the UN. 
This syllogism also works fine. Recall that intent2 means "wants 
[based on its own interpretation of international law]." The conclu-
sion here is logically sound: Congress would not want to close the mis-
sion if it interpreted international law to preclude such closure. The 
problem in the PLO case was that Congress apparently interpreted 
international law differently. The legislative history showed that Con-
gress was under the impression that international law did permit the 
closure of the PLO mission. While the reasoning here is valid, prem-
ise B is contrary to what the court found, and therefore the conclusion 
is not valid. 
Thus with precision of definition, either syllogism is perfectly ac-
ceptable for lawyers and courts, even where the troublesome charac-
teristics identified by Rodes and Pospesel are present. It really does 
little good to criticize the holding of the PLO case for the invalidity of 
its logic; the logic is impeccable if the definition is clear and consis-
tent. It is instead necessary to examine the underlying policies that 
lead to one legal definition versus another.92 The fact that Congress 
92 This is not to say that stare decisis is not important. Consistency is integral to 
the law, and if values are weighed so as to lead to one balance, strong policy consider-
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and the court had differing understandings of international law re-
quired the court in the PLO case to choose one definition of intent 
over the other. That decision can be criticized without saying that a 
logical fallacy occurred. Indeed, it may obscure thoughtful policy 
analysis to criticize the decision solely on logical grounds. 
Going back now to the nonlegal examples used by Rodes and Pos-
pesel, we may legitimately wonder whether the same precision of defi-
nition enables us to say that the reasoning in those cases was not 
defective after all. Recall the following:93 
You can learn from the dictionary that a person who collects butter-
flies is a lepidopterist. 
George collects butterflies. 
So, you can learn from the dictionary that George is a lepidopterist. 
"Learn" can mean "derive sufficient information independently 
to conclude," but it could also mean "derive information to apply 
specifically" . 
Pat hates Communists. 
Natasha is a Communist. 
So, Pat hates Natasha. 
"Hate [Communists]" can mean "dislike people one knows to fol-
low [Communism]," but it can also mean "bears ill-will toward those 
who follow [Communism] regardless of whether their views are 
known." Similarly: 
O'Brien believes that all Irish children should learn Gaelic. 
Maureen is an Irish child. 
So, O'Brien believes that Maureen should learn Gaelic. 
"Believes that all Irish children" could mean "believes about peo-
ple that one knows to be Irish children," but it could also mean "be-
lieves about people who are Irish children regardless of whether they 
are known to be Irish children." 
The differences in meaning can be sharpened by examining the 
effect of the difference. The lawyer who is asked for meaning is accus-
tomed to asking, ''Why do you want to know?" Let us say for instance, 
that a certain form may be filled out only with information "learned 
ations support making the same balance in subsequent indistinguishable situations. 
See John M. Rogers, Lawer Court Applicatian of the "Overruling Law" of Higher Courts, 1 
LEGAL THEORY 179, 186-87 (1995). But as Rodes and Pospesel clearly explain, a pre-
cedent may be consistent with two different subsequent applications. See RODES & 
POSPESEL, supra note 1, at 335. For example, either intent} or intent2 could be used to 
explain the cases that preceded the PLO case. 
93 RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 1, at 310; see also supra text accompanying notes 
67-68. ' 
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from a dictionary." Under one meaning of "learned from a diction-
ary," the words "George is a lepidopterist" may be entered; under the 
other, they may not. To determine whether the words may be en-
tered, it avails us little to examine the logic of the syllogism. Instead 
we have to ask what reasons underlie the limitation. 
In the second example, assume we are constrained by the direc-
tive not to seat Pat next to "someone he hates." Can we seat Pat next 
to Natasha in the exceptional circumstance that we know that she is a 
Communist but Pat does not? Under one meaning of "hate" we can, 
under the other we cannot. There is nothing wrong with the logic if 
the meaning is the latter. 
Similar observations could be made about O'Brien's belief. For 
instance, we may be asked to give Gaelic dictionaries to "those who 
O'Brien believes should learn Gaelic." Under one definition of "be-
lieves should learn Gaelic," Maureen should get a dictionary even 
though O'Brien mistakes Maureen to be English. 
Perhaps the most difficult example to parse this way is Smith's 
Beliefs, which Rodes and Pospesel flatly state is an invalid argument:94 
Smith believes that all Lutherans are Protestants. 
Jones is a Lutheran. 
So, Smith believes that Jones is a Protestant. 
Yet even here, if we ask why we care whether or not Smith be-
lieves Jones is a Protestant, we can identify two meanings of "believes 
[that Jones is a Protestant]" that must be distinguished in the special 
situation where Jones is a Lutheran but Smith thinks Jones is Catholic. 
Suppose that Smith's wife dies and leaves $1,000 to each of 
"Smith's Notre Dame classmates that Smith believes are Protestants." 
Jones appears in court to claim his share, and demonstrates that 
"Smith believes that all Lutherans are Protestants" and that Jones is a 
Lutheran. Smith admits on the witness stand that he never heard of 
Jones. DoesJones get the $1,000? Under the logic of Smith's Beliefs, 
above, Jones seems entitled to the money. 
Let us hypothesize two factual situations that could have led to 
the unusual bequest. In the first scenario, Smith's wife knew that 
Smith believes that Mormonism is a Protestant religion, although she 
was not sure whether Mormonism is indeed a Protestant religion. She 
also knew that Smith had forgotten the religious affiliation of all of his 
classmates. She wanted to accommodate her husband's admiration 
for non-Catholics who attended Notre Dame. In these circumstances 
it is logical to interpret "believes are Protestants" to mean "believes 
94 /d. at 298. 
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their actual religion is a Protestant religion." Jones should get the 
money. 
On the other hand, if Smith's wife wanted to reward classmates of 
Smith that actually accompanied Smith to Bible study in college, but 
to exclude from those particular acquaintances the ones who had re-
cently renounced their religion, then "believes are Protestants" could 
mean "knows regarding a particular individual that that individual ac-
cepts Protestant tenets." 
Under the former meaning, the syllogism of Smith's Beliefs is per-
fectly valid, andJones should get the money. Under the latter mean-
ing, the premise simply cannot be demonstrated without assuming 
that Smith knew a personal fact about millions of individuals, and 
Jones of course therefore loses. But if the premise could be demon-
strated somehow, the conclusion would be valid. To evaluate the con-
clusion requires an understanding of the meaning of "believes to be 
Protestant," and once that is ascertained the logic is clear. 
The different meanings attributable to the first leg of Smith's Be-
liefs might be characterized by Rodes and Pospesel as de dicto and de re 
interpretations of the statement that Smith believes all Lutherans are 
Protestants. Rodes and Pospesel indeed stress the need to be careful 
in ascertaining whether a de dicto or de re meaning is intended.95 But 
they draw a puzzling conclusion from the observation. They posit the 
following statement: 
(S4) Green believes all tenured members of the Philosophy Depart-
ment to have Ph.D.'s.96 
The statement could have two meanings identified by Rodes and 
Pospesel: 
(S4A) Green believes of each and every individual who is a tenured 
member of the Philosophy Department that he or she has a 
Ph.D. or 
(S4B) Green believes (the proposition) that all tenured members 
of the Philosophy Department have Ph.D.'s.97 
The two meanings of S4A and S4B ate obviously different. In 
S4A, the speaker means that each actual tenured member of the Phi-
losophy Department (e.g., Professors White, Black, and Brown), is be-
lieved by Green to have a Ph.D. White, Black, and Brown are 
presumably accurately characterized by the speaker (as believed by 
Green to have a Ph.D.), and it is not necessary for Green to even know 
95 fd. at 308-09. 
96 fd. at 308. 
97 fd. 
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that White, Black, or Brown is a professor at all for the statement to be 
true. In S4B on the other hand, Green believes something about a 
category of persons. The speaker attributes beliefs to Green arising 
from Green's knowledge of university promotion requirements rather 
than from Green's acquaintance with individual professors. (This is 
akin to the difference between Smith's knowledge about religions ver-
sus his knowledge of his buddies' religions.) According to Rodes and 
Pospesel, S4A is a de re statement and S4B is a de dicto statement.98 
Either statement could lead to the following conclusion: 
(S5) If Gray is a tenured member of the Philosophy Department, 
then Green believes that Gray has a Ph.D. 
Rodes and Pospesel suggest the following strategy for choosing 
between S4A and S4B as the "more satisfactory" interpretation of S4: 
"In the absence of any evidence, the conservative choice would be the 
de dicto reading, because it will block potentially invalid inferences 
such as the inference to S5, or the one drawn in the 'Smith's Beliefs' 
argument."99 This suggestion is puzzling because S5 sounds more il-
logical as a consequence of the de dicto (S4B) meaning than as a conse-
quence of the de re (S4A) meaning. 
In any event, if we are consistent in our assignment of meanings, 
S5 is a valid inference regardless of whether we are using the S4A mean-
ing or the S4B meaning. Once again, let us hypothesize different sce-
narios for making the statement S4. Under S4A, remember, Green is 
familiar with the individual educational accomplishments of certain 
people, but may not know their affiliation. Let us say that Green has 
invited White, Black, Brown, and Gray to a club meeting, along with 
some other people. The invitation says that invitees believed by Green 
to have a Ph.D. will be invited by Green to give a talk. Some of the 
invitees wonder whether Gray will be invited to talk. One of them, a 
person called "A," states S4, 
Green believes all tenured members of the Philosophy Department 
to have Ph.D.'s. 
meaning S4A: 
Green believes of each and every individual who is a tenured mem-
ber of the Philosophy Department that he or she has a Ph.D. 
The conclusion S5 is perfectly valid: 
If Gray is a tenured member of the Philosophy Department, then 
Green believes that Gray has a Ph.D. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 309. 
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That is, the listener who accepts A's statement as true in the sense 
of S4A can validly use the knowledge that Gray is a tenured member 
of the Philosophy Department to conclude that Green believes that 
Gray has a Ph.D. No one in this example has any thought that Green 
knows the employment affiliation of anyone. 
Now contrast the situation where Green knows a lot about univer-
sity promotion policies but does not know the educational back-
ground of any specific person. He is, for instance, a university 
consultant who is asked to make a list of eligible persons for an office 
that requires a Ph.D. He uses a university roster compiled by rank and 
department to make a list of possible candidates, those he believes to 
have Ph.D.'s. Now two people, A and B, know the above facts. Person 
A expresses S4 to person B: 
Green believes all tenured members of the Philosophy Department 
to have Ph.D.'s. 
with the meaning of S4B: 
Green believes (the proposition) that all tenured members of the 
Philosophy Department have Ph.D.'s. 
The conclusion S5 is once again peIfectly valid: 
If Gray is a tenured member of the Philosophy Department, then 
Green believes that Gray has a Ph.D. 
That is, if listener B accepts A's statement as true in the sense of S4B, 
then B can validly use B's independent knowledge that Gray is a ten-
ured member of the Philosophy Department to conclude that Green 
believes that Gray has a Ph.D. and that Gray is therefore on the list. 
In other words, the inferences are invalid only if the meanings 
are shifted. There is no more likelihood of false inference when the 
meaning is shifted from a de dicto meaning to a de re meaning than 
when the meaning is shifted from a de re meaning to a de dicto one. It 
is therefore questionable to prefer a de dicto or de re interpretation 
because of the relative likelihood of an invalid inference. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I should note that in other sections of their admirable book, 
Rodes and Pospesel stress clearly and persuasively the need for precise 
definition of legal statements to avoid the logical fallacy of "equivoca-
tion" (using shifting meanings of the same words to come to false con-
clusions) .100 The points they make in those other sections appear 
sufficient to resolve the assertedly invalid reasoning in Duchnicz and 
100 Id. at 220-25,315-17 
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the various "intensional context" hypotheticals that bear such a resem-
blance to the PLO holding. 
All of this is not meant to diminish the value of devotion to logic 
in legal analysis. On the contrary, the points are made out of an abun-
dance of caution not to give ammunition to the anti-logic people. We 
have to be careful not to criticize Duchnicz and the PLO case, no mat-
ter how bad those cases may be, without examining the underlying 
policy reasons for excusing acts that are consented to, and for attribut-
ing to Congress the intent to conform to international law. If legal 
conclusions like those in Duchnicz and the PLO case are characterized 
as failures of logic because the reasoning is invalid even when the 
meaning of "consent" or "intent" is determined, then there is a danger. 
The danger is that the members of the polity to whom legal opinions 
containing such criticism are addressed-readers of opinions and re-
ceivers oflegal advice-will intuit (rightly) that more is going on than 
the type of formal logical defect that Rodes and Pospesel suggest. The 
members of the polity will ultimately demand more justification for 
legal analysis that lacks such a policy component, and they may do so 
by inartfully demanding that logic be disregarded in favor of "justice." 
For those of us who believe that logic furthers justice, that would be-
in those memorable words from classic television's The Life of Riley--"a 
revolting development." 
